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I

n 2002, the Supreme Court essentially shut the door on the question of the
constitutionality of capital punishment for the intellectually disabled. Daryl
Atkins, whose intellectual capacity was equivalent to that of a nine- to twelveyear-old, was convicted of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to death.
Atkins’ sentence was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, but reversed by
the United States Supreme Court in a landmark decision.1 Thus, the Court
finally determined that the death penalty, when applied to the intellectually
disabled, constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” banned by the Eighth
Amendment. However, even after years of legal precedent and increasingly
favorable public opinion, this 6-3 decision included passionate dissents and
sparked debate among legal scholars and the public. Some questioned how
exactly “mentally retarded” would be defined and whether the decision would
create a new loophole that could be used to escape the death penalty. Death
penalty abolitionists, on the other hand, applauded the decision, arguing that
executing the intellectually disabled did not fulfill the goal of retribution or
deterrence, the two principle justifications for capital punishment.
This paper will explore the controversies, constitutional questions, and
legal precedents leading up to the Atkins v. Virginia decision. It will also
attempt to answer a few important questions regarding the issue as a whole:
What were the most significant factors and legal precedents that led to the
new constitutional interpretation in Atkins? On what legal grounds did the
minority justices dissent and how strong were their arguments? How does
the exemption of the intellectually disabled affect the institution of capital
punishment in America? What issues have yet to be resolved?
In order to trace the evolution and legal reasoning behind the issue of
capital punishment for the intellectually disabled through the Supreme Court,
it is necessary to first explore how it became a federal issue. Until the 1960s,
American capital punishment was entirely an issue of states’ rights, leaving
virtually every aspect from civil procedure through method of execution to
the discretion of individual states. This individual discretion led to a very
wide range of policies and little accountability for those states, especially in
the South, whose policies proved to be particularly discriminatory. However,
by the 1960s, movements to abolish the death penalty quickly began to
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gain momentum. Since the goal of these groups was to abolish the death
penalty nationally, its supporters felt the most effective way to do so was to
frame the question as a federal issue, not one for individual states to decide.
The framing of capital punishment as a federal question incorporated the
diverse policies of many states into one entity, the constitutionality of which
could only be decided by the United States Supreme Court.2 As a result, the
Supreme Court decided not only the constitutionality of the institution of
capital punishment as a whole, but also the many individual and controversial
aspects of its application. These included rulings on exactly what types of due
process rights are sufficient to meet the standards of the Eighth Amendment
(Gregg v. Georgia), whether rape should be considered a capital crime (Cocker
v. Georgia), the constitutionality of executing a person that is declared
“insane” at the date of their execution (Ford v. Wainwright), claims of racial
discrimination (McCleskey v. Kemp), the execution of juveniles (Thompson v.
Oklahoma, Stanford v. Kentucky, Wilkins v. Missouri), and the execution of the
“mentally retarded” (Penry v. Lynaugh, Atkins v. Virginia).3
To understand how the Court came to a decision in Atkins, it is important
to study the relevant cases leading up to it, the opinions of the various
justices, and the evolution of the constitutional interpretation, especially
with regard to the Eighth Amendment. The first case that would directly
affect the evolution of the Eighth Amendment’s application to the death
penalty for the intellectually disabled was Weems v. United States. In 1910,
Paul A. Weems was sentenced to 15 years in prison (including hard labor)
by the Philippine courts, for the crime of falsifying a public document for
the purpose of defrauding the government.4 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that this sentence was “cruel and unusual” in that such a severe punishment
was excessive relative to the minor crime that was committed. Weems is
largely credited for creating the “proportionality” principle for determining
the constitutionality of any type of punishment. The case established the
standard that “all punishments (including the death penalty) are excessive
and therefore constitutionally prohibited if not ‘graduated and proportioned
to the offence.’”5 This decision became a significant tool used by the majority
in Atkins, who argued that the intellectually disabled were less culpable, and
therefore, proportionally, their punishments should be less severe.
The 1958 Supreme Court decision in Trop v. Dulles was a significant next
step in the evolution of the Eighth Amendment. The Court ruled that the
punishment of removal of citizenship, when applied to a natural-born citizen,
was always excessive and therefore unconstitutional because it involved “the
total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”6 Most
importantly, in his majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren established
the precedent that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”7
These words established the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the
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Eighth Amendment as a living, constantly evolving principle. In other words,
this concept validated the importance of a “national consensus” in proving,
in Atkins, that society’s standards of decency had indeed evolved to the point
of invalidating the death penalty for the intellectually disabled.
Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the case that largely reinstated the death penalty
after the Furman v. Georgia (1972) decision resulted in a nation wide de
facto moratorium, also had a significant impact on the majority’s reasoning
in Atkins twenty-two years later. In Gregg, the Court held that if criminal
sanctions do not “measurably” contribute to retribution, deterrence, or both,
they should be deemed “excessive” and therefore unconstitutional.8 Since it is
difficult to argue that the execution of the intellectually disabled contributes
to either retribution or deterrence, the majority in Atkins was later able to use
this important decision to their advantage.
Ford v. Wainwright (1986) was the first decision to limit the ability of
the State to execute a person based on their mental diagnosis. During his
years on death row, Alvin Ford developed a mental disorder that included
“paranoid obsession on the KKK and delusions of power and control.”9
Ford’s psychiatrist concluded that his mental disorder was “severe enough
to substantially affect” his “present ability to assist in the defense of life.”10
As a result, the Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the Eighth Amendment
did not allow “the execution of an inmate who is incompetent at the time
of execution.”11 Much of the majority’s reasoning in Ford would be closely
echoed in the ideas expressed later in Atkins. These included assertions that
executing the incompetent “offends humanity” and that it is “uncivilized for
society to so avenge itself on the person… disabled by mental illness.”12 The
majority also emphasized a lack of evidence for deterrence and retribution
as well as the defendant’s inability to understand “the finality of the death
penalty”13 as reasons for ruling in favor of Ford.
Eighth Amendment protection was further strengthened after the Supreme
Court ruled that the execution of capital offenders at or below the age of 15
was unconstitutional in Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988).14 However, despite
this evolution of the Eighth Amendment, in Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) the
Supreme Court ruled that the execution of the “mentally retarded” did
not violate the Constitution. In this case, Penry’s intellectual disability was
disputed. His IQ was estimated to be between 50 and 60, he had the mental
age of a six- to seven-year-old, had suffered brain damage from birth, was
repeatedly beaten and abused as a child, and dropped out of school in the
first grade.15 Although this mental retardation did diminish his “personal
culpability for the murder,”16 during the sentencing phase of his trial the
jury was not instructed that they could take these factors into account as
mitigating evidence, which might have resulted in a lesser sentence. Despite
this, the Supreme Court still voted 5-4 for keeping the death penalty in place
for the intellectually disabled, emphasizing the fact that there was not yet
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a “national consensus” against it. However, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
writing for the majority, did simultaneously argue that the jury should be
allowed to consider “mental retardation” a mitigating factor during the
sentencing phase of capital trials.
Finally, in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Atkins v. Virginia
on appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court. In 1998, Daryl Atkins was
convicted of armed robbery and murder, and consequently sentenced to
death. Atkins had an IQ of 59, equivalent to that of a nine- to twelve-yearold, and was classified as “mildly mentally retarded” by a forensic psychologist
testifying on behalf of the defense. In the first case to reconsider the death
penalty for the “mentally retarded” since Penry in 1989, the Court had to
once again answer the question of whether executing individuals in this group
constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment
taking into account the “evolving standards of decency” of a 21st century
society. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled to reverse Penry, led by Justice
Stevens who wrote on behalf of the majority.
Stevens wrote that the mentally handicapped could not be assigned the
same degree of moral blame for the “most serious adult criminal conduct”
because of their “disabilities in the areas of reasoning, judgment, and control
of their impulses.”17 When addressing the issue of the proportionality of the
punishment, the Court relied on statistical evidence, arguing that since Penry
was decided, a “national consensus” had developed against the execution of
those with intellectual disabilities. This was established by examining the
“consistency in the direction of change” with regard to the 16 states that
retained the death penalty but had outlawed its application to the “mentally
retarded” since 1989.18 In an attempt to remain consistent with the Ford
ruling, the Court left the individual states free to determine what criteria
would be used to decide which offenders were in fact “mentally retarded.”
In accordance with the principles of Gregg, the majority argued that the
two justifications for capital punishment, retribution and deterrence, were
not furthered by the execution of the intellectually disabled. The majority
argued the mentally handicapped did not have the ability to perform a fully
“calculated” murder worthy of execution because of their mental deficiencies.
The Court also mentioned that the exemption of the intellectually disabled
from execution would not have an effect on those of full mental capacity,
who would be not qualify for the exemption. Finally, it was determined that
the “reduced capacity” of defendants with intellectual disabilities left them
particularly vulnerable to wrongful convictions, especially because they were
easily coerced into giving a false confession.
Justice Scalia, who in his opinions consistently defends the constitutionality
of the death penalty, wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Scalia claimed that the majority’s decision
relied upon “nothing but personal views” and was an example of what he
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refers to as Eighth Amendment “death-is-different jurisprudence.”19 He
argued in favor of the traditional interpretation of the exemption only for the
severely retarded or “idiots,” which was in place in 1791. Only these “idiots,”
he argued, displayed a clear “deficiency in will” and an inability to tell right
from wrong significant enough to be exempt from the death penalty. Scalia
also disputed the majority’s “national consensus” and “evolving standards of
decency” arguments, pointing out that only 18 of the 38 states where capital
punishment was legal (47 percent) had enacted exemptions for the mentally
retarded.20 The decision, Scalia protested, only added to the long list of
impediments limiting the use of the death penalty, none of which existed at
the time of the Constitution’s ratification. Additionally, Scalia worried that
the symptoms of mental retardation can be easily feigned and that those who
do so “risk nothing at all.”21
Despite the controversy that surrounded it, there is no doubt that the
Atkins decision has had significant effects on the institution of capital
punishment. First, the decision immediately affected hundreds of death row
inmates who were either able to be exempted from execution altogether or
were given new sentencing hearings. According to a Cornell Law School study,
of the 3,700 inmates on death row,22 234, or about seven percent, had filed
Atkins claims as of 2009.23 The success of defendants who have been able to
prove their disability depends largely upon the specific procedures employed
in each state. For example, the success rate of Atkins claims in North Carolina
has been about 80 percent, while the success rate in Alabama has been 12
percent.24 This discrepancy is due to the availability of funding for postconviction litigation and the different definitions of mental retardation, as
well as other factors.25 As states refine their definitions of mental retardation
and procedural restrictions, these factors will continue to have a significant
impact on the implementation of Atkins.
Though the Atkins decision has been largely helpful thus far, the
discrepancy between states’ different definitions of mental competency and
their struggle to create clear-cut criteria has been the biggest roadblock to
its implementation. The most relevant example of how the implementation
of these criteria can be unclear ironically comes back to the case of Atkins
himself. Although Atkins’ execution was ruled unconstitutional in the 2002
Supreme Court decision, this was because, at the time, his test results clearly
showed that he was “mildly mentally retarded” under the definition that was
in place in the State of Virginia. In Virginia, the IQ threshold for a diagnosis
of mental retardation was, and still is, a score of 70. When Atkins was tested in
1998 he scored an IQ of 59, well below the threshold.26 However, the State of
Virginia continued their prosecution of Atkins even after the Supreme Court’s
decision, claiming that he was not truly mentally retarded. In fact, when
Atkins was tested again in 2004, two years after the Supreme Court decision,
defense experts discovered his IQ had jumped to 74, while prosecutors claimed
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it was 76.27 Dr. Nelson, who tested Atkins in 1998 and 2004, attributed this
jump to Atkins’ constant exposure to the lawyers that worked on his case and
the “intellectual stimulation” that came with his long trial, which included
“practicing his reading and writing skills, learning abstract legal concepts, and
communicating with professionals.”28
After these tests were made public, many called for the resentencing of
Atkins and felt that the death penalty was now not only constitutional,
but also necessary in his case. Doubts arose about the accuracy of both the
1998 and 2004 tests, and many claimed that this was sufficient evidence
that intellectual disability could be faked through the manipulation of IQ
tests. However, some psychologists claimed that while it may be possible to
deliberately score poorly on an IQ test, “it would be very difficult to feign
low cognition across time, different settings and multiple examiners.”29 The
prosecution argued that Atkins’ 1998 tests and diagnosis were tainted because
his prior poor performance in school was due to drugs and alcohol, not to a
mental deficiency.
The discrepancies in these tests raise important unanswered questions
surrounding capital punishment. The Court’s decision to give the states
discretion in formulating the criteria for implementation led to controversy
over who should be responsible for deciding a criminal’s competency. Leading
up to the mental competency trial, many of those familiar with the Atkins case
also expressed concern over the objectivity of the jury that was responsible for
determining Atkins’ mental state, as they were all informed of the full details
of the murder. Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center
claimed that this knowledge would “infect” the objectivity of the jury.30
Referring back to the 2002 Atkins decision, Dieter argued that, “The Supreme
Court ruled that we should not execute the mentally retarded, it did not say it
should be a balancing act with the gruesomeness of the crime.”31
Following the trial, Atkins’ execution date was set once again, this time for
December 2, 2005, due to his alleged newly acquired mental competency.32
As the accuracy of this diagnosis continued to be questioned, Atkins’ execution
was stayed once more. However, in 2008 Judge Prentis Smiley Jr. received
notifications of allegations of substantial prosecutorial misconduct. After a
two-day hearing regarding these allegations, Judge Smiley determined that
these allegations were, in fact, credible and subsequently commuted Atkins’
sentence, replacing it with life imprisonment without possibility of parole,
leaving the ultimate question of Atkins’ intellectual disability unanswered.33
In conclusion, although the question of whether to apply the death penalty
to the intellectually disabled is still a complex and difficult one, it is clear that
Atkins made a substantial leap in protecting this vulnerable group. Despite
the ongoing discrepancies between state practices, there is no doubt that
fewer intellectually handicapped criminals are being unjustly and pointlessly
executed without serving any type of criminal justice function. However, the
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Atkins decision and the strengthening of the Eighth Amendment through this
line of cases, though celebrated by abolitionists, presents a type of “doubleedged sword.”34 If the goal for abolitionists continues to be a nationwide
rejection of the death penalty, these types of cases may actually serve to
stabilize it as an institution. If these cases continue to eliminate particular
moral concerns about the application of the death penalty, abolitionists,
through these victories, may simultaneously eliminate the elements of
capital punishment most vulnerable to attack. As the Court continues to
carve out these important categorical exemptions, it may also undermine
“the power of abolitionists’ objections to capital punishment by exempting
the most powerful ‘poster children’ of the abolitionist movement.”35 Given
the conservative composition of the current Court and wide-spread popular
support, it does seem that the death penalty is here to stay for the foreseeable
future. For this reason, the Court’s categorical exemptions and strengthening
of Eighth Amendment protection in order to make the institution more
balanced and humane are a move in the right direction.
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